Optimizing Pandemic Preparedness and Response Through Health Information Systems: Lessons Learned From Ebola to COVID-19. by Lal, Arush et al.
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 1
©Society for DisasterMedicine andPublic Health, Inc. 2020. This is anOpenAccess article, distributed under the termsof the Creative Commons
Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited. DOI: 10.1017/dmp.2020.361
Optimizing Pandemic Preparedness and Response
Through Health Information Systems: Lessons Learned
From Ebola to COVID-19
Arush Lal, MSc ; Henry C. Ashworth, MPH ; Sara Dada, MSc ;
Laura Hoemeke, DrPH, MPH ; Ernest Tambo, PhD
ABSTRACT
Strengthening health systems and maintaining essential service delivery during health emergencies
response is critical for early detection and diagnosis, prompt treatment, and effective control of pandemics,
including the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Health information systems (HIS) developed
during recent Ebola outbreaks in West Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) provided
opportunities to collect, analyze, and distribute data to inform both day-to-day and long-term policy
decisions on outbreak preparedness. As COVID-19 continues to sweep across the globe, HIS and related
technological advancements remain vital for effective and sustained data sharing, contact tracing,
mapping andmonitoring, community risk sensitization and engagement, preventive education, and timely
preparedness and response activities. In reviewing literature of how HIS could have further supported
mitigation of these Ebola outbreaks and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, 3 key areas were identified:
governance and coordination, health systems infrastructure and resources, and community engagement.
In this concept study, we outline scalable HIS lessons from recent Ebola outbreaks and early COVID-19
responses along these 3 domains, synthesizing recommendations to offer clear, evidence-based
approaches on how to leverage HIS to strengthen the current pandemic response and foster community
health systems resilience moving forward.
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Health information systems (HIS) are systemsfocused on health-related “data collection,distribution, and use that provide informa-
tion at regular intervals.”1 HIS are diverse and can
include surveillance systems, electronic and mobile
health records, health databases, and qualitative and
quantitative epidemiological data.2 They also collect
a wide array of health information to guide decisions
at all levels of a health system, from daily management
to policy decision-making to implementation. In non-
crisis settings, effective HIS can be a critical resource in
improving health system function and resilience to
public health threats.1 In crisis settings, routine and
emergency HIS provide real-time, vital information
to guide proactive and rapid response activities.3,4
Despite the value of robust HIS in responding to pan-
demics, many countries face challenges in coordinating
and expanding HIS, sharing data and information,
addressing public mistrust and misinformation, and
preventing negative health outcomes during and after
outbreaks.1,3
Effective HIS implementation could have improved
response to the 2014-2016 West Africa and 2018-
2020 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Ebola outbreaks.4,5 Three major gaps emerged as
opportunities for optimizing HIS: governance and
coordination, health systems infrastructure and resour-
ces, and community engagement and risk communica-
tion. Governance in public health emergencies refers
to the political processes and mechanisms that steer
response and resilience efforts.6 Health systems infra-
structure focuses on providing the foundation and
resources for planning, delivering, evaluating, and
improving public health.7 Community engagement
includes initiatives that ensure individuals and com-
munities are central in public health priorities and
action plans.8 As the world responds to the novel
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), recent analysis
suggests that strengths and weaknesses in HIS have
re-emerged along these 3 domains, offering timely
insight on how to scale up evidence-based and efficient
HIS to contain the ongoing pandemic.
CONCEPTS IN DISASTER MEDICINE
These emerging themes portray a cyclical relationship; strength-
ening HIS may lead to more resilient health systems with
community-based approaches to emergency preparedness and
response, while strengthened health systems provide the foun-
dation for robust and sustainable HIS. Noting the lack of docu-
mentation on the implications and added value of scaling up
HIS and related digital innovation during public health emer-
gencies, a critical analysis synthesizing concepts along these
domains is needed to prevent and mitigate COVID-19 and
other emerging public health threats worldwide.
This piece uses examples from Ebola and COVID-19 because
of their similarities as fast-moving infectious diseases that have
been designated as Public Health Emergencies of International
Concern (PHEIC), their high impact on morbidity and
mortality, and their disruption of routine health services and
economic activity at a global scale. This concept study assesses
lessons learned from HIS deployment during the 2014-2016
West Africa and 2018-2020 DRC Ebola outbreaks and recent
insights from the COVID-19 pandemic, synthesizing recom-
mendations to optimize ongoing and future preparedness
and response actions across 3 overarching domains: gover-
nance and coordination, health systems infrastructure and
resources, and community engagement.
GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION
Ebola
Different government priorities and agendas are reflected in
HIS implementation and have varying implications for how
preparedness and response interventions are developed and
implemented at all levels of the health system. For example,
an agenda centered on global health security has different
implications for program priorities and resource mobilization
than an agenda focused on universal health coverage—both
played an important role in influencing the governance of
health systems in Ebola-affected countries.
Governance in West Africa during the Ebola outbreak
was weakened not only by the governments’ inadequate
coordination and capacity to prevent, detect, and respond
to the emergency, but also by the public’s deteriorated trust
in government intervention.9 Meanwhile, the DRC, an active
conflict zone with a complex network of informal politics,
offered unique challenges and dangers that impacted HIS
implementation.10
Robust governance and coordinated responses require
cohesive health systems with up-to-date information to enable
proactive decision-making, rapid resource mobilization, and
effective risk communication strategies; the lack of compre-
hensive HIS can further fragment these priorities.1 For exam-
ple, during Ebola outbreaks in West Africa, the governments
of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone were slow to initiate nec-
essary emergency response and consistent communication
messaging to contain the outbreak.11 This was partly due
to the lack of existing information systems in place to under-
stand the extent of the outbreak over an expansive geographic
area.12 Politicization of priorities, complicated frontline
actions, and an increasingly complex network of international
actors made it difficult to transparently share much-needed
data and information on outbreak consequences, weakening
rapid response and global solidarity.
For HIS to function effectively, governing bodies and decision-
makers need to address barriers to transparent data collection,
analysis, and sharing. Notably, the governments of Guinea and
Sierra Leone drew criticism for withholding vital information
from Médecins Sans Frontières, which was also supporting
the Ebola response.13 This prevented stakeholders from
coordinating health system strategies. Furthermore, the Ebola
surveillance system in Sierra Leone was kept distinct from the
country’s Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
(IDSR) framework, partially due to administrative and opera-
tional barriers such as contested ownership and governance
over data.14,15 Effective surveillance systems and proactive
community contact tracing require robust, coordinated over-
sight and capability to share data with diverse stakeholders.
Furthermore, integrated national roll out of the District
Health Information Software 2 (DHIS2)—a free, open source,
and locally customizable health management data platform
used by over 50 countries—could provide real-time data
that governments can leverage to better inform aligned
outbreak responses.1,16 Promoting efficient and useful HIS
solutions, including incorporating epidemic information
systems into existing local DHIS2 and IDSR systems rather
than running them in parallel, could avert future failures in
policy coordination. To improve governance during public
health crises, ministries of health should take ownership of
and integrate routine and emergency HIS through cohesive
governance of data sharing mechanisms and digital risk com-
munication strategies.14
COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed how the chronic lack
of HIS within and among nations continues to exacerbate the
lack of cohesive national and global health governance.
Furthermore, little has been documented on how earlier
successes have been deployed and leveraged globally in
COVID-19 mitigation and response tactics.
For example, the West Africa 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic
showed howweaknesses in governance and data sharingmech-
anisms hindered coordinated response efforts.17 As robust data
are the foundation for effective HIS, the World Health
Organization (WHO), alongside leaders from low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) and leading scientific jour-
nals, developed protocols to streamline the release of data from
clinical trials during public health emergencies.17 These
policy proposals helped lead to the early public release of
the COVID-19 genome sequence and the polymerase chain
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reaction assay protocols, as well as enabled early detection of
cases in the COVID-19 pandemic.18 This highlights
accessible and transparent clinical trial data as an important
component of HIS during health crises. However, current
mechanisms do not similarly obligate the dissemination of
information from observational studies, risk analysis and
disease monitoring programs, and outbreak surveillance, thus
hindering effective pandemic preparedness and response
coordination.19
Efficient dissemination of clinical trial results is important to
characterize specific disease treatment protocols, but does
not fully inform governments on how they should respond
to rapidly changing transmission dynamics, asymptomatic
reservoirs, and other COVID-19 epidemiological data.18,20
As demonstrated during Ebola outbreaks, timely information
from contact tracing, disease monitoring, and surveillance
are vital to ensure governments can generate up-to-date
data and evidence-based policies to spearhead coordinated
public health emergency responses.21 Consequently, data
from observational studies, efficacy of mitigation strategies,
and transmission statistics are critical for effective national
and international resource mobilization, timely allocation,
and technical assistance.20 This requires promoting open
access distribution and data-sharing mechanisms as an impor-
tant foundation to improveHIS governance and interoperabil-
ity before, during, and after health emergencies—building on
lessons learned after Guinea and Sierra Leone withheld this
vital information during Ebola.18
Another important factor that has impaired unified pandemic
response policies within several countries and internationally
has been the lack of data from cohesive HIS to drive systematic
screening. For example, the United States did not begin
screening until January 17, 2020, at which point they initially
focused only on travelers from China at select airports, even
though COVID-19 had already spread to multiple other
nations.22 This absence of timely information and data sharing
leads to weak national and international coordination, affect-
ing logistics in triage and testing, quarantine, and treatment
options, as similarly demonstrated by Sierra Leone’s struggle
to integrate routine and emergency HIS during Ebola.
One critical HIS solution to streamline screening and build
local and national government capacity for informed decision-
making is the implementation of a national electronic medical
records (EMR) system. Previous studies on national EMRs
have demonstrated their ability to enhance screening, reduce
medical errors, improve treatment of acute and chronic dis-
eases, and save up to billions of dollars in health-care costs
annually.23,24 National EMRs can be a constant data stream
for HIS during outbreaks, providing detailed information at
the individual and population levels to identify cases, track
transmission, and support unified government priorities. The
success of integrated EMRs has been demonstrated by
Taiwan’s response to COVID-19. By leveraging robust
information communications infrastructure, national EMRs,
and transparent data sharing practices developed following
the SARS outbreak, Taiwan has used real-time analytics to
stratify risk, screen potential cases, quarantine positive individ-
uals, and treat patients.25 Despite significant inbound travel
from the epicenter of the COVID-19 outbreak in mainland
China, Taiwan continued to have fewer cases thanmany neigh-
boring countries, with fewer than 450 confirmed cases as ofMay
5, 2020.25,26
The COVID-19 pandemic exposes weaknesses in governing
bodies to coordinate responses across diverse contexts and
in conjunction with varying global commitments, such as
the WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and UN
Sustainable Development Goals. While multiple factors play
a role, integrated data and information sharing systems are
essential in outbreaks like Ebola and COVID-19. Future
commitments should include (1) bolstering international
cooperation and global solidarity for openly publishing
a wide variety of research during health emergencies, and
(2) strengthening contextual HIS within countries, including
centralized EMRs and interoperable digital platforms that
integrate routine and active HIS at all stages of an epidemic.
HEALTH SYSTEMS INFRASTRUCTURE & RESOURCES
Ebola
HIS have been leveraged to broadly strengthen health sys-
tems and enable the monitoring of ongoing health service
utilization during outbreaks.15 To facilitate health-care infra-
structure capacity-building, HIS could help countries equi-
tably optimize available local and international resources.
In the West Africa Ebola outbreak, challenges in health
systems infrastructure included scarcity of both physical
and personnel resources. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone
have among the fewest physicians per capita worldwide.27
Meanwhile, the shortage of personal protective equipment
(PPE) was further exacerbated by a lack of procedural systems
and accountability mechanisms in place for safe use and
removal of PPE.28 These scarcities limited the capacity of
health systems to mitigate and respond to case management
needs in both Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) and other
health facilities. Often, assistance was diverted from routine
health services, leading to inaccessible care and higher mor-
tality from other diseases (ie, malaria and HIV) than from the
outbreak itself.29
In West Africa, information about stockpiles and available
resources was also hindered by poor telecommunication (espe-
cially in rural areas) and a lack of information technology (IT)
equipment and expertise, which is vital to capture HIS data
during public health emergencies.30 Following the West
Africa outbreak, partnerships were developed to strengthen
digital health infrastructure to support health emergency
preparedness.31 When the first Ebola outbreak occurred in
the DRC in May 2018, the Ministry of Health “called on
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digital systems” as a key tool in response efforts.32 This digital
infrastructure would enable HIS to rapidly share and connect
up-to-date data, therefore providing greater insight on day-to-
day changes at the facility level during outbreaks.
Building up IT and digital resources strengthens surveillance
and response systems, which provides early information on
case numbers and contact tracing. A study in 2017 evaluating
DRC’s Technical Guide for IDSR found that developing an
adequate surveillance system was limited by the capacity of
the health system itself, including low levels of training and
inadequate supporting resources.5 Furthermore, at various
points throughout the outbreak in Sierra Leone, some hospi-
tals were overrun and had to turn away suspected cases while
others were only half-full.33 Here, a coordinated HIS could
have allowed for more efficient resource and patient allocation
across clinics, improving overall care by reducing strain on
health facilities. Insight provided by HIS, thus, can be used
to inform decisions about physical resource allocation. For
example, an integrated HIS in West Africa to provide timely
updates on disease hotspots and health facilities could have
been leveraged to equitably allocate the limited PPE and avoid
stockpiling or supply chain disruptions.4,34
These experiences in West Africa highlighted the critical role
of IT infrastructure in HIS for outbreak preparedness and
response. Therefore, it was promising to see growing use of
digital technology to scale up HIS in the DRC 2 years later to
guide decision-making where public health infrastructure may
be inadequate to meet patient needs.31 However, there is still
an opportunity to better develop HIS and related IT to maxi-
mize resource allocation and quality health service delivery in
resource-limited settings.
COVID-19
In the current COVID-19 pandemic, the scarcity of PPE
and emergency supplies has been an issue for even the most
well-financed countries and health facilities.35,36 Healthcare
workers globally have been working without adequate protec-
tive equipment and have been forced to decide who should
live and who should die through allocation of limited ventila-
tors.37 Without information on access and delivery to guide
effective redistribution, the lack of these vital resources
leads to higher rates of disease transmission and increased
mortality, especially in underserved communities—just as they
did in West Africa and the DRC during Ebola outbreaks.36
Furthermore, mandating increased production of required
equipment may only be possible in resource-rich contexts
and may still be inadequate to fulfill demands in high-burden
areas.37 However, strong HIS are essential for the equitable allo-
cation of critical resources in pandemics such as COVID-19, as
supply chain requirements vary significantly across locations.
HIS can redirect the allocation of resources precisely to where
they are most needed across regions and over time, so that total
demand is met within the constraints of limited resources
available. Taiwan successfully demonstrated this by leveraging
its integrated HIS to analyze multiple national datasets for
transparent distribution of PPE to citizens in locations of
greatest need.25
While nations should incorporate HIS to survey and
track internal stockpiles and allocate supplies based on current
and predictive needs, the global context must also be
considered. Though the majority of COVID-19 cases were
initially confirmed inHICs, transmission of the virus exponen-
tially increased in LMICs.38 As Ebola outbreaks earlier demon-
strated, many LMICs do not have the ability to scale up supply
of PPE, and often have inadequate supporting infrastructure to
effectively implement nonpharmaceutical interventions, such
as physical distancing.37,38 Current trends suggest that LMICs,
including Sudan, Nigeria, and Kenya are at heightened risk of
being devastated by COVID-19 due to dense populations,
local conflicts, and fragile infrastructure.39 Without the ability
to efficiently identify and reallocate excess resources from
countries that have reached epidemic control to the most vul-
nerable regions with unmet demand, COVID-19 is likely to
disproportionately impact these vulnerable communities.39,40
Effective HIS can address this gap by identifying areas with
real-time shortages in supplies and personnel, just as they
did toward the end of the DRC Ebola outbreak. This is even
more vital in LMICs that cannot rely on other mechanisms to
feasibly “flatten the curve.”
Timely support and technical assistance from multilateral
organizations, such as WHO and UNICEF, could provide
resource development and joint expertise in improving health
systems governance and programming through strengthened
domestic and global HIS implementation.41 Developing HIS
within nations could increase global commitments to quality
data collection and analysis for evidence-based decision-
making. Therefore, global solidarity and investments should
be directed toward scaling up HIS and related digital technol-
ogies, including real-time data on existing country resources,
shifts in geographic hotspots, and infrastructure gaps to curb
the spread of COVID-19.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Ebola
Public health emergency interventions often target human
behavior change; such measures require reliable information
brokered through effective risk communication and commu-
nity trust. During the recent Ebola outbreaks, fear and uncer-
tainty of the disease appeared to spread as fervently as the virus
itself. The mounting public panic paved the path for wide-
spread misinformation and rumors, seeded by convoluted
messaging and a chronic lack of trust in domestic governments
and foreign intervention.33,42 This delayed control measures,
as sociopolitical factors were not integrated into HIS to guide
pragmatic response strategies at the local level. For example, in
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West Africa, rumors that ETCs were dangerous negatively
influenced health-seeking behavior.43,44 In the DRC, 2 deca-
des of ongoing conflict added layers of community mistrust of
government officials and humanitarian aid organizations.45
Low levels of trust hampered outbreak control programs
and fueled attacks on health-care workers and ETCs.46
Community engagement and open dialogue involving local
leaders gradually restored trust and eventually provided critical
pathways for information to support HIS ownership and guide
future outbreak preparedness and response.33
In West Africa, the transition from ineffective “sensitization”
messages solely aimed at correcting misinformation to bottom-
up communication campaigns involving local communities
was a turning point in the epidemic response, as it empowered
community-based management through informal information
systems.47-49 In Sierra Leone, community event-based surveil-
lance (CEBS) systems were facilitated by information about
social and ecological contexts from local community volun-
teers to detect, isolate, and treat potential cases to prevent
further transmission.50 To be effective, CEBS required local
buy-in and relied on relationships among volunteers, com-
munities, and external stakeholders to supplement HIS that
tracked clinical and epidemiological data but lacked social
context.51 Integrated HIS could thus provide guidance to
collect and monitor more context-specific information.
While the importance of community engagement has been
emphasized in outbreak response, established strategies for
sustainable integration of relevant indicators into HIS have
not been clearly determined.52 Lessons from West Africa
pointed to the significant role of chiefs and local leaders,
but also emphasized informal structures of power, suggesting
the need for community participation in HIS decision-making
and implementation.53 Further strategies included recruiting
local staff for social mobilization, working with religious
leaders, engaging local radio and journalists, and hosting com-
munity meetings—all possible sources for relevant information
in HIS.54,55
Notably, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC) published a guide outlining a 5-step
process for community engagement to collect data for effective
decision-making that was implemented in the DRC outbreak,
with a network of volunteers and an extensive database to collect
and track rumors and community perceptions as the outbreak
transpired.56 This demonstrates how HIS, when leveraged effec-
tively, can be used to incorporate data related to contact-tracing
networks aswell as relevant experiences, perceptions, and rumors
that may hinder response efforts. This work has been conducted
mostly by anthropologists, but there is a need to conduct analyses
that can be systematically replicated, validated, and compared.49
A robust HIS can offer the possibility of collecting and system-
izing salient social data, and allow communities to be actively
involved in informing real-time insights that improve prepared-
ness and response efforts.
COVID-19
While the role of HIS in bolstering community resilience
and engagement to strengthen outbreak response has been
documented following the West Africa and DRC Ebola
epidemics, similar mistakes are still being made in addressing
the COVID-19 pandemic.53
One of the biggest sources of mistrust has been the circulation
of false and misleading information about COVID-19 preven-
tion and treatment options.57 For example, a lack of effective
COVID-19 communication in Iran’s response programming
continues to fuel mistrust and inhibit adequate emergency
measures, mirroring poor risk communication practices
from prior Ebola outbreaks.58 While credible authorities,
such as the WHO and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), have routinely provided up-to-date
information, their social media posts have only reached several
hundred thousand social media engagements, such as liking or
sharing a Tweet or Web page. This level of credible social
media engagement is dwarfed by the over 52 million engage-
ments garnered by hoax and conspiracy theory websites by
March 2020, highlighting the challenge of curtailing “viral”
fake and misleading news that spreads quickly among the gen-
eral public.57 Social media posts with disinformation have
been increasing, often with racist and xenophobic remarks par-
ticularly aimed toward people of Chinese origin living in other
countries, as exemplified by the hashtag “#Chinese
DontCometoJapan” trending on Twitter.59 The lack of effec-
tive surveillance, tracking, and accountability of these xeno-
phobic statements by current systems means governments
struggle to forecast their negative effects. This has further iso-
lated key populations, stigmatized reporting of symptoms, and
fueled prejudices that may harm communities well beyond the
current crisis.60 The WHO refers to this as the “Coronavirus
Infodemic” and has noted that tackling misinformation is just
as important as fighting the pandemic itself.61 Similar to chal-
lenges faced in communicating preventive practices at the start
of the West Africa Ebola outbreak, it is clear that initial strat-
egies for disseminating accurate information and risk commu-
nication for COVID-19 are not working, and the role of
community trust is, thus, more critical than ever.
HIS have been used to generate valid scientific data, but are
not being used to identify at-risk populations to effectively
engage. Strategies the WHO has implemented in the
COVID-19 pandemic include directly engaging with social
media platforms and ensuring partner websites have banners
linked with accurate information.61 HIS could aid in address-
ing the current COVID-19 infodemic and future health
crises through 2 additional mechanisms. First, integrated
HIS could help identify vulnerable populations at greater risk
of COVID-19 exposure, detailing community engagement
methods supported by data collected at the community level.
Vietnam, similar to the DRC during Ebola, has ensured a
strong focus on engaging communities through media directed
by medical experts, which has proven extremely effective in
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reducing transmission of COVID-19.62 However, more com-
prehensive HIS could be used to develop individualized
programs that meet the needs of specific communities with
targeted interventions, including tailored information
campaigns, socioeconomic support, and access to health-care
resources. Second, just as contact tracing identifies people
potentially exposed to COVID-19, HIS could include infor-
mation about the source and spread of misinformation and
create counter-campaigns with accurate information, drawing
from IFRC’s 5-step process for community engagement in
the DRC Ebola outbreak. Powerful analytics such as artificial
intelligence (AI) and big data technologies could be leveraged
to ensure that these procedures are conducted effectively
while also protecting privacy.63 Robust HIS could, therefore,
refine risk communication that builds trust as well as informs
new population-specific community engagement methods.
NEXT STEPS
Strengthening contextual HIS are critical to inform outbreak
response, but also generate evidence to build resilient health
systems. Exploring and applying HIS lessons from previous
Ebola outbreaks provides an opportunity to improve pandemic
preparedness, mitigation, and response strategies for other
emerging diseases. These experiences are of particular value
to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The uncertainties fueled
by rapid disease progression and a lack of effective information
systems across local, national, and global levels exposes evolv-
ing gaps in global HIS that should be addressed to curb trans-
mission and mitigate downstream health and socioeconomic
impacts.
Governance and Coordination
Strengthening local and regional HIS governance and
coordination provides vital data that allows governments to
make real-time policy decisions, allocate resources, and inform
preparedness plans. Priorities should be aligned across global
health agendas to reduce fragmentation of policies and programs
that constrain HIS during health emergencies. At a national
level, recent Ebola outbreaks have demonstrated the urgency
for integrated routine and emergency surveillance systems to
avoid redundant or parallel systems, and COVID-19 has under-
scored the need for improved data streamlining and data sharing
at all levels of governance.39 At an international level, reforms
from the Ebola outbreaks have led to improvements in sharing of
clinical trial data.18We recommend further reforms so that other
sources of vital HIS data, including observational studies and
disease monitoring and surveillance programs are openly
shared. This is critical to ensure all countries have the necessary
information to implement rapid protocols and strategic plans for
potential pandemics such as COVID-19.41
Health Systems Infrastructure & Resources
Building health systems infrastructure requires scaling
up HIS implementation and integration in primary health-
care programs to help efficiently direct key resources like
PPE and health workers. TheWest Africa and DRCEbola out-
breaks demonstrated the need for stronger HIS and enhanced
IT capacity to manage limited resources. In contrast, Taiwan’s
COVID-19 pandemic response that leverages an integrated,
national EMR has shown how robust HIS can be a vital
tool to support contact tracing, surveillance, and PPE distribu-
tion in the context of scarce medical supplies.44 While the
measures implemented in Taiwan may not be achievable
everywhere, even small investments in health systems infra-
structure may yield massive health gains, before, during, and
after a crisis.43 We recommend that as countries strengthen
their HIS, they consider investments in IT and national
EMRs as mechanisms for responsive, accountable, and equit-
able resource allocation. Centralized databases of HIS may also
enable novel analysis with the help of AI and other innovative
technologies.
Community Engagement
Promoting community engagement and resilience is crucial in
responding to emerging disease outbreaks and other health
emergencies. The Ebola epidemics and ongoing COVID-19
pandemic demonstrate how local context affects adequate
response, thus emphasizing community participation as a
critical component at all stages of emergency preparedness.
HIS provide a platform to employ and adapt community
empowerment and engagement. First, communities can guide
consideration, prioritization, and decision-making for which
data are gathered and analyzed. This would improve accuracy
and build local trust so that HIS could be used as they were in
Taiwan to identify, track, and treat high-risk populations with
targeted approaches.25 Second, addressing rumors and misin-
formation is vital in stopping transmission and improving
cooperation for better health outcomes.53 Therefore,
HIS should be developed and implemented to address the
“infodemic” by helping identify sources of misinformation
and generating targeted evidence with relevant information
for specific communities.
CONCLUSION
The failures of health systems in the previous Ebola outbreaks
and a globally catastrophic pandemic like COVID-19 are often
discussed, but may overlook the critical role of information sys-
tems in optimizing decision-making and health emergencies
response. Robust HIS that are adequately financed and devel-
oped before a future outbreak can cyclically strengthen health
systems and pandemic preparedness and response capacities.
High-performing and effectively leveraged HIS are catalytic
in informing coordinated global health governance and ensur-
ing timely, transparent data sharing. They strengthen health
infrastructure by reducing fragmentation and costs while
streamlining equitable resource allocation. They offer new
ways to foster community engagement, combat misinforma-
tion, and cultivate trust.
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As COVID-19 has shown, major pandemics can drive
even the most stable economies into fragile conditions while
forcing already-fragile contexts into more vulnerable states.
Investments in HIS can prevent this cascading deterioration
of global economies and security by offering timely insights
as a backstop to enable national governments to quickly pre-
vent, detect, and respond to public health threats, fostering
more robust response and recovery interventions and building
a resilient post-COVID-19 world.
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